A bstract
T his p a p e r claim s th a t th e hazy in te rse c tio n b etw een the diverse fields o f theology and the o th er sciences is not to be clarified in the first place by exploring m etho dological p arallels or d eg rees o f consonance b etw een theology and th e sciences. W hat should be explored first is the epistem ological questio n o f th e n a tu re and status o f explanations and o f explanatory claims in th eo logy and science. T he sim ilarities, as well as im portant differences betw een theology and science, will thus be highlighted w hen we focus this discussion on th e sh a ping of rationality in theology and science, on th e h er m en eu tical p ro b lem o f relatin g context and m eaning, and on th e fa llib ilist n a tu re o f b o th th e o lo g ic al an d scientific truth claims.
IN T R O D U C T IO N
F or those who are serious about living the C hristian faith in the context of o u r con tem porary postm odern world, the task of doing theology in a way th a t might really m ake a difference presents itself as a daunting and even confusing challenge. D eep ly affected by contem po rary cu ltu ral an d political issues, by th e successes o f the natural sciences and technology and the pervasive presence of especially the psycho- its values th at also force us to confront the realities of en v ironm ental destruction, political, econom ic, racial, and sexual injustice, still ultim ately m ake sense in the light of Sinai and Calvary? O ur world has, of course, been fundam entally changed by an all-pervasive scien tific culture that shapes the rationality of the way we live o ur daily lives. T he advent of m odem thought has in fact led to an unparalleled transform ation in the way we as hum an beings have com e to regard the natural world and our relation to it. In a way it could even be argued that, in the history o f W estern thought, the advent of scien tific culture outshines everything since the rise of Christianity (cf Peacocke 1990:27) .
Today theologians and scientists, w hether they agree or not, and w h eth er they even talk or not, are to g eth er in th eir awe for the way the powers of hum an reason and im agination m anage to far exceed our dem ands for biological survival, and for the extraordinary ability of the hum an m ind to rep resen t aspects of th e w orld th at are inaccessible to o ur ordinary senses. B ut scientists are also teaching theologians som ething today: the baffling and puzzling incom pleteness o f all our attem pts at fin ding m eaning and intelligibility in o ur world. O ur know ledge of the n atu ral world stretch e s out in two directions: to the basic constituents o f physical reality on the one hand, and to th e higher levels of biological com plexity on th e o th e r (cf P e a cocke 1990:82). W e should indeed be in awe in the face of the am azing and inven tive creativity of the w orld in which we have evolved: the elusive and unpicturable basic sub-atom ic entities o u t of which everything is m ade, including ourselves, have potentialities unknow n and undescribable in term s of the physics that discovers and the m athem atics that symbolizes them . T herefore, at both the extrem es o f our com p reh en sio n -the sub-atom ic and the perso n al -we face such baffling dep th s th at even scientists today speak of the mystery of the universe.
A rthur Peacocke (1990:83ff) has recently convincingly argued for the merging of this search for intelligibility with the search for ultim ate m eaning in life. Science today forces us to contem plate the future of our planet since we have to reckon with its certain d isap p earan ce. T he energy o f o u r sun, w hich sustains life on earth , is finite: T he sun is about halfway through its life and the tim e left for the existence of the e arth is about the sam e as the length of tim e it has already existed. Thus, the d em ise o f all life on e arth , including o u r lives as hum ans, is really q u ite certain .
Science today therefore forces us to ask; W hat is the m eaning of this universe and of 426 HTS 49/3 (1993) J W van Huyssteen our presence in it? T hese are the uhim ate questions th at bring theology and science closer to g eth er for they are questions th a t cannot be answ ered through the resour ces of science alone. Thus, the scientifically observed and understood ch aracter of the n atu ral w orld, including o u r existence as hum an beings, is today o f im m ense theological im portance: for w hat n atu re is like, w hat the m eaning o f hum an life is, w hat G od is like, indeed w hether or not G od exists, have becom e questions th at are so interlocked that they caim ot be considered in isolation anymore.
For theology today, an all-im portant focus o f its dialogue with our contem pora ry culture is therefore not only the trem endous problem s th at would arise if theology should choose to re tre a t to the insular com fort of an exclusivist theological confessionalism, but also and precisely its uneasy relationship with the sciences. In fact, as theologians we find ourselves confronted with a special challenge: First, we have to try o u r best to keep together, in a m eaningful whole, a very specific sense of conti nuity with the C hristian trad itio n and a respect for religious and cultural pluralism, as well as a resisting of any form o f political o r confessional au th o ritarian ism (cf Taylor 1990:31ff). Second, postm odern thought also challenges us to explore again the p re su p p o sed continuity b etw een C h ristian theology an d th e g e n e ra l hum an enterprise of understanding the world rationally.
In trying to do this, however, we soon discover th at not only theology, but also In addition to this, it is well known th at theology has been fundam entally influ enced by both the philosophical cosmology o f the ancien t w orld and the scientific discoveries o f ou r tim e. T he n atu ral sciences, how ever, have also been seriously influenced by theological presuppositions throughout its long history. T h e n in e te e n th cen tu ry , w ith th e triu m p h o f indiv id u alism in relig io n and professionalism in science, obviously changed all that when science, under the surge of Darwinism, moved away from theology rath er dram atically. Even in our complex w orld today, however, C hristian theologians who are looking for ways to in terp re t the idea of creation meaningfully still hang on to some very basic com m itm ents: the idea that nature is intelligible; that nature is relatively autonom ous; and th at reality, as created by G od, has some intrinsic unity as G o d 's creation. For many in the con tem porary theology-and-science debate, especially with the abandonm ent very often of the traditional idea of a C reato r G od, this has becom e a driving force behind all th eir reflection: Even if the origin of the cosm os may ultim ately be unintelligible, n ature itself is em inently intelligible and reflects the sam e rationality as the hum an Science. P rinceton Theological Seminary followed suit by establishing the first, and at this tim e, the only C hair in T heology and Science in th e w orld. In all of these instances, the ground-breaking work of A m erican and British scholars like Ian B ar bour, A rthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, and Thom as T orrance, is being carefully analyzed and built upon by a host o f younger scholars in fields as diverse as philoso phical theology, philosophy o f science, cosmology, evolutionary biology, n e u ro b io logy, genetics, physics, astrophysics, quantum physics, ecology, biochem istry, anth ro pology, technology, and the cognitive and social sciences.
T H E Q U E S T F O R IN T E L U G IB IU T Y
In spite of this trem endous diversity, the theology and science deb ate today is dom i Theology and sdcDcc C reator. R oger Trigg recently argued th at it is no m ore a m iracle th a t th e hum an m ind can u n d erstan d th e w orld than th a t th e hum an eye can see it; evolution in a sense explains both, also dem onstrates why we are so at hom e in the world (cf Trigg 1989:212) and why superior intelligence corresponds with a highly intelligible world. 
T H E O L O G Y , SC IE N C E A N D EPIST EM O L O G Y
T he question of how theology and science should relate to one a n o th er is, of course, neither a theological nor a scientific issue. It is, rather, an epistem ological issue, i.e.
an issue a b o u t how two very d iffe re n t claim s to know ledge a re to be re late d (cf M cM ullin 1981:26). W hat is at stake here is basically the nature of knowledge, and the way it presents itself in the often very divergent claim s resulting from religious and scientific worldviews. O ur conviction that o u r world is highly intelligible, how ever, at least partly m otivates us to search for som e form of unified theory. T h ere is no way that we could be content with a plurality o f unrelated languages if they are in fact languages abo u t the sam e world -especially if we are seeking a co h eren t in ter p re ta tio n o f all ex p erien ce (cf B arb o u r 1990:16). In o u r a tte m p t to in te g ra te a single w orld-view th a t w ould in co rp o rate both theology and science, th e obvious q u estion is th e refo re going to be: w hat is the statu s of scientific claim s ab o u t our how ever, th a t none o f th ese positio n s tak e th e com plexities o f th e rela tio n sh ip betw een scientific and theological epistem ology into consideration at all. N ot only can the Big Bang not autom atically be assum ed to be eith er the beginning of tim e or o f th e u n iv erse, o r can it be ta k e n for g ra n te d th a t th e lapse of tim e since the so-called Big Bang is necessarily the age of the universe (cf M cM ullin 1981:35): The Big Bang theory and scientific cosmology in general -as W illem D rees has recently p o in ted out -is not in the first place a b o u t th e origin of th e universe, b u t ra th e r about its subsequent evolution. Stephen Hawking's question 'did the universe have a beginning, and w hat is the n atu re of tim e?' (cf H aw king 1988:1) thus has to be very carefully defined both scientifically and theologically. But in the sam e care-ful way we have to realize th a t the in ten t of, for instance, th e G en esis passages is to underline the dependence of an intelligible and contingent universe on a C reato r (cf M igliore 1991:95), and not necessarily to specify a first m om ent in tim e, at least in the technical sense of contem porary cosmology.
This exam ple from the history of W estern thought alerts us to th e epistem ological fallacy of directly inferring from contem porary science to theological doctrine.
It would be a serious category m istake to infer directly from , for exam ple, the Big Bang to creation, from field theory to the Spirit of G od, from chance to providence, from en tro p y to evil, o r from th e an th ro p ic p rin cip le to design. T he Big Bang model, for instance, does not en title us to infer -theologically or scientifically -an ab so lu te beginning in tim e. O n the o th e r hand, th e re 's nothing scientifically or philosophically inadm issible about the idea that an absolute beginning m ight have occurred. A nd if it did occur, it could look som ething like the horizon-event descri bed by the Big Bang theory. T o describe this horizon-event as 'the C reatio n ', how ever, is to explain it in term s o f a cause that would not be scientific anym ore. W hat could a theologian then rightly infer from this highly successful theory? It w ould be possible to say, theologically, th a t if our universe had a beginning in time through the unique act of a creator, from our point of view it would look som ething like the Big Bang cosm ologists are talking about. W hat one cannot say is th a t the doctrine of creation 'supports' the Big Bang m odel, or that the Big Bang 'supports' the C hristian doctrine o f creation (cf M cM ullin 1981:39) . As C hristians we should therefore take very seriously the theories of physics and biology: not to exploit o r to try and change them , b u t to try to find in te rp re ta tio n s th a t w ould suggest con-432 / r r s 49/3 (1993) 1 ÍV van Huyssteen sonance with the C hristian view point. Theology can, th erefo re, never claim to be capable of scientific theory appraisal, but should rath er been seen as one elem en t in th e co n stru ctin g o f a b ro a d e r c u ltu ral w orld-view (c f M cM ullin 1981:51). T he C hristian can never sep arate her or his science from h er or his theology, but he or he should also learn to distrust epistem ological short-cuts from the one to the other.
O ne way to do this would be to find a paradigm that would yield a fm e-tuned episte mological consonance.
Thus are revealed the philosophical and epistem ological complexities involved in trying to relate theology and science today. In fact, I think th a t it is safe to say T h e c u rre n t focus on the re latio n sh ip betw een theology and science -som e prefer to talk of the emerging discipline of theology and science -suggests, however, a fall from epistem ological innocence regarding this complex and fascinating issue.
For th e philosophical th eologian this p resen ts a challenge to his o r h er p ersonal com m itm ents and beliefs: a challenge that also implies a quest for a plausible model of theological contextuality, because it thrusts to the front questions about the status of religious claims to knowledge and about the rationality of b elief in G od.
C urrently, how ever, the relatio n sh ip of theology and science is as vague and confusing as ever: som e see them as fundam entally in conflict with one an o th e r; others as independent of one another, others as in creative dialogue and consonance with one another, while still others thinkers wants to integrate theology and science in term s of either a theology o f nature or some form of natural theology.
F O U N D A T IO N A U S M IN T H E O L O G Y A N D SC IE N C E
W hat we are certain about today, at least, is that in any contem porary evaluation of the re la tio n sh ip betw een theology and science a fo u n d a tio n a list view o f e ith e r Theology and sdencc science or theology would be epistem ologically fatal. F oundationalism holds that, in the process of justifying o u r knowledge-claims, the chain of justifying evidence can not go on ad infinitum if we are ever to be in a position to claim th a t we have justi fied our know ledge (cf S teu er 1987:237). Thus, foundationalists specify w hat they tak e to be the u ltim a te fo u n d atio n s on which th e ev idential support-system s for various beliefs are constructed. T he sort o f features most frequently m entioned are self-evidence, incorrigibility, being evident to th e senses, indubitability and being self-authenticating and properly basic, i.e. foundational.
F oundationalism , as the thesis th at o u r beliefs can be w arranted o r justified by appealing to som e item o f knowledge th at is self-evident or beyond doubt, certainly elim inates any possibility of discovering a meaningful epistem ological link betw een theology and the o th er sciences. To claim that knowledge rests on foundations, is to claim th at th ere is a privileged class of beliefs w hich is intrinsically cred ib le and able, th erefo re, to serve as u ltim ate term in atin g points for chains o f justification.
These 'givens' could be anything from sense data to universals, essences, experience, B oth theology and science, fu rth e rm o re , have to sp eak o f en tities w hich a re not directly observable and bo th m ust th erefo re be p rep ared to use m odels and m eta phors as heuristic devices. This is also the context within which Jo h n Polkinghorne can state that m athem atics is the natural language of physical science, while symbol an d m e ta p h o r can be se e n as th e n a tu ra l lan g u ag e for theology (P o lk in g h o rn e 1991:2).
T he epistem ological move beyond foundationalism in science points to the big gest revolution in physics since the days o f Newton: the discovery of the elusive and fitful sub-atom ic world of quantum theory. H e re o u r w orld has been proved to be strange beyond our powers o f anticipation. If this is tru e for physics, it undoubtedly can be tru e for theology as well. T h e q u an tu m w orld exhibits a counter-intuitive non-locality, a togetherness-inseparability which provides a pow erful im age o f holis tic solidarity which may even be a suggestive consonant im age for the field of theo logy. Q u an tu m theory has indeed taught us to be o pen to the totally unexpected, even to the initially apparently unintelligible (cf Polkinghorne 1991:3ff). 
T H E SH A PIN G O F R A T IO N A L IT Y IN T H E O L O G Y A N D SC IE N C E
W hat will be need ed in this interdisciplinary theology-and-science discussion is a m ethodological approach th at not only recognizes theology as an explanatory disci pline, but also takes seriously the epistem ological problem of the shaping o f ratio nality in theology and science, the herm eneutical problem relating context and m ea ning, the explanatory role of religious experience and beliefs, and the fallibilist and in science we th erefo re should bew are o f an overly narrow and ra tio n alistic con ception of rationality. R ationality as such is complex, many-sided, extensive and as w ide-ranging as the dom ain of intelligence itself.
Follow ing the lead o f N icholas R esch er (1988) we can now identify at least th ree contexts of rationality th at are highly relevant not only for theology, but also for the social, hum an and natural sciences: the cognitive context, the evaluative con text, and the pragm atic context. W hat this m eans for theological reflection is, th at in theology as well we have good reasons for hanging on to certain beliefs, good re a sons for m aking certain m oral choices, and good reasons for acting in certain ways.
W ithin a holist epistem ology these th ree contexts go to g eth er as a seam less whole and also can be reg ard ed as the th re e reso u rces for ratio n ality in theology: they m erge in the com m on task o f uniting th e best reasons for b elief, evalu atio n and action. We therefore act rationally in m atters of belief, action and evaluation when o u r reasons 'hang to g e th e r', (i.e. are cogent). In theology, rationality im plies the capacity to 'give account', to provide a rationale for the way one thinks, chooses, acts and believes. Theory-acceptance, then, has an epistem ic dim ension. W hen we ask, however, w hat else other than belief is involved in theory-acceptance, the pragm atic and ev alu ativ e dim ensio n s o f th eo ry -accep tan ce a re rev e a led (c f V an F ra a sse n 1989:3ff).
In both theology and science, rationality th erefore pivots on the deploym ent of good reasons: believing, doing, choosing the right thing for the right reasons. Being rational is therefore not just a m atter of having som e reasons for w hat one believes in and argues for, but having the best or strongest reasons to support the rationality of o ne's beliefs within a concrete context. R ationality in theology and science, as we saw e a rlie r, is shaped prim arily by the qu est fo r intelligibility. A nd this u n d e r standing at the d eep est possible level is atta in ed by inferring to th e best possible explanations. In this sense rationality and explanation go together very closely.
T h e hazy in te rse c tio n b etw een the diverse fields of theology an d th e o th e r sciences is therefore not in the first place to be d eterm ined by exploring m ethodo logical parallels or degrees o f consonance betw een theology and the sciences. W hat should be explored first is the epistem ological question of the n atu re and status of explanations and explanatory claim s in theology and the o th er sciences, since th eo logical doctrines and constructs, as well as scientific theories aim at giving the best possible explanations in th eir respective fields. In this reflection we should be wary o f d an g ero u s epistem ological short-cuts: ratio n a lity should n ev er be red u ced to scientific rationality, and scientific rationality should never be reduced to natural scientific rationality.
ISSN 0259 'M22 = UTS 49/3 (1993) T he question th a t now arises is w hether th ere is a unitary theory of explanation th at w ould allow us to speak o f explanation in the singular w hen referrin g to the b ro a d e r sp ectru m o f acad em ic disciplines. E ventually it will b eco m e clear th at th ere are im portan t p arallels betw een explanation in th e sciences and in theology.
EX PL A N A TIO N S IN T H E O L O G Y
H ow ever significant these parallels might be, religious and theological explanations do have unique aspects as well: they are norm ally all-encom passing and deeply p e r sonal, they often arise from vague and elusive questions concerning the m eaning of life, and as religious answ ers they provide ultim ate m eaning in life. R eligious -and eventually theological explanations -thus provide a context o f security for the b elie ver and also involve a faith-com m itm ent to G od. This im plies th at both the scope and co n ten t o f theological explanations may set them a p a rt from explanations in other areas. In assessing the explanatory role of religious experience and beliefs we therefore should assess the continuities as well as the discontinuities betw een th eo logical and other types o f explanations. Scientific explanations, of course, are never com pletely im perso n al, but they a re capable of achieving a high d eg ree o f in te r personal ag reem en t. A rt and ethics a re m uch m ore personal th an science and as such may n o t re p re se n t a re a s in w hich universal ag re e m e n t is a tta in a b le . Even m ore personal is the realm of religious experience, w here also the refracting influ ence of culture is powerfully present (cf Polkinghorne 1991:54).
T he central goal of n atural scientific theories is to explain the em pirical world.
T o call an explanation 'scientific', is to say that the explanation draws on science for its inform ation, and th at the criteria o f evaluation o f how good an explanation it is, are being applied, using a scientific theory (cf V an F raassen 1989:156). T heories of explanation, however, have been directly influenced by im p o rtan t shifts in the p ro b lem o f n a tu ra l scie n tific ra tio n a lity , esp ecially since th In th e social and h u m an sciences a long an d le a rn e d tra d itio n has o p p o sed explanation to em p h atic u n d erstanding. E xplanation in th e social sciences, how ever, does not n eed to be dow n-played in th e light o f th e b ro a d e r h erm en eu tical purpose o f the social and hum an sciences. It also would be incorrect to claim that, because o f th eir subject m atter, the social and hum an sciences are m ore subjective than the natural sciences: the role of subjective factors in the form ulation of natural as well as social scientific explanations is today widely accepted. Eventually we shall see that not only in theology, but also in the social, hum an and natural sciences, the subjectivity of in terp re tin g belongs right in the h e a rt of the explanatory task. O n an o th er level the explanatory task in the social sciences is closer to explanations in theology than to explanations in the natural sciences. Both in the social and hum an sciences and in theology the object o f research is itself already sym bolically struc tured, mainly as a result of a long and ongoing history o f interpretation. Therefore, if all science then is herm eneutical, in the hum an and social sciences, and especially in the history o f theological ideas, we encounter w hat som e scholars have called a 'double herm eneutic' o f having to in terp ret again the already p re-in te rp reted world of our experience (cf Clayton 1989:88).
F rom this we may conclude that explanation -w hether in the natural, social or h um an sciences o r in theology -is always a form o f ra tio n a l reco n stru ctio n , th at rational thought is never purely objective, that context greatly influences the in ter pretive th eo retical process, and th at any research program and its explanations can only be partially evalua ted at any given tim e. A nd in o u r quest for intelligibility, coherence -although a necessary criterion for rational thought -can by itself never be a sufficient condition for the stories in which we articulate our hope and symboli cally unify our fragm ented experience (cf Lash 1985:277) .
O ur quest for som e form o f epistem ological consonance betw een theology and science thus brings us to philosophical explanations. P hilosophical explanations, like o th er explanations, aim to address and coherently answ er som e specific qu es tion. T hey are philosophical in th at they are not lim ited in scope to any particular discipline, o r aspect of experience (cf Clayton 1989:104) . In trying to understand the explanatory role of religious experiences and the beliefs th a t con stitu te them , it is im p o rtan t to n ote that religious explanations share som e very significant features w ith p h ilosop hical exp lan atio n s. T he m ost im p o rta n t o f th ese a re th e ir g re ate r generality or depth and an em phasis on systematic coherence and meaningfulness. betw een the inherited beliefs and practices of a specific religious trad itio n and the co n tem porary experience o f its ad h e re n ts (cf V an H uyssteen 1989:200ff) . T hese ex p lan a tio n s arise ou t of trad itio n al ex p erien ce and can be p h rased in term s of traditional doctrines, the practices (liturgies and rites) of a religious comm unity, and its norm s o r codes of behaviour, o r they can be constructed in term s o f th e b ro ad er intellectual, social and ethical intersubjective life-experience o f believers.
As such theological ex p lan atio n s function to continually e n su re a tra d itio n 's relevance to the challenges posed by contem porary contextual questions. Clayton (1989:149) is therefore right when he states that theology is not prim arily a descrip tive (first-o rd er) but an explanatory (second-order) endeavour. T h e re are indeed good reasons for theology to pursue explanatory adequacy and academ ic excellence.
All theological explanations should th erefo re be open to intersubjective ex am ina tion and criticism , which m eans th at theological statem en ts should at all tim es be construed as hypotheses (cf V an H uyssteen 1989:143ff) . A nd since all attem p ts to clarify C h ristian beliefs necessarily involve d ep e n d e n c e on cate g o ries n o t draw n from the C hristian trad itio n , as well as use of gen eral notions such as truth, m ea ning, coherence and reference, Christian theology will always find itself in necessary discourse with other theologies, and with the science and philosophy o f its times.
In conclusion I would therefore like to claim that the quest for intelligibility and explanatory progress in theology is also d e p en d e n t on the evolving n a tu re of the epistem ic values th a t have shaped theological rationality in history. This implies th at the realist assum ptions and com m itm ents o f ex p erien ced C h ristian faith are relevant epistem ological issues to be dealt with seriously in the theology and science discussion. By doing this, theology could move away from the absolutism of foundationalism as well as from the relativism of anti-foundationalism . This can fu rth er be achieved by show ing th at because theology is an activity o f a com m unity o f inqui rers, th ere can be no way to prescribe a rationality for th at activity w ithout consi dering its actual practice.
T he theology-an d-scien ce discussion in a very specific way rev eals how the e x p lan a to ry ro le o f in te rp re te d ex p erie n c e in theology can only be ad eq u a te ly explained in term s of an experiential epistem ology. T his m eans not only th at reli gious experien ce is b e tte r explained theologically, b u t also that, in explaining the role of experience, the philosophical theologian will have to move from the question of rationality to intelligibility, from intelligibility to the question o f personal u n d er T he nature of the ongoing discussion betw een theology and science should help us to realize that, in spite o f a prom ising and em erging new field of study, the com plex relationship betw een scientific and religious epistem ology is m ore challenging th an ever. T his becom es all th e m ore clea r w hen we keep in m ind no t only the d e c o n stru c tio n an d d iscovery o f th e lim ita tio n s o f th e n a tu ra l sc ien ces in th e p ost-K uhnian era , b u t also w hen we focus carefully on th e n a tu re o f th e n atu ral sciences. T he sciences are em inently co m petent when it com es to theory-construction and to experim ental and pragm atic enterprises, but they are incom petent when it com es to finding answers to our deepest religious questions.
T he fundam ental differences betw een theology and science should th erefo re be respected, as well as the difference betw een different forms o f explanations not only in the different sciences, but also betw een theology and the o th e r sciences. H ow ever, in spite of im p o rtan t differences and som etim es radically different levels of explanation, theology and science do share a com m on ground of rationality. A th eo logy and a science th a t com e to discover this m utual quest for intelligibility, in spite of im portant differences will also be free to discover that nothing that is p art of, or the result of, natural scientific explanation, need ever be logically incom patible with theological reflection. S tep h en H aw king's (1988;140f) d isturbing questio n 'w hat place would there be for a creato r in a universe w ithout a beginning in tim e?' could then be answ ered as follows: in principle, every possible place; a 'place' th at might even sh a tte r all o u r conventional (an d unco n v en tio n al) m odels for depicting the transcendence and im m anence of G od. W h eth er the universe had a beginning in tim e or not does not affect o ur reading of the G enesis story in its depiction of the com plete depend en ce o f the universe on G od. G od is not a G od o f the gaps, or a G od of the edges (cf Polkinghorne 1991:81) but is the C hristian theologian's answ er as to why th e re is so m eth in g ra th e r th an no th ing . S cience can tell us little or nothing ab o u t o u r experience of subjectivity, ab o ut the astonishing em ergence of personhood, and about why we have an intelligible universe. G od is the nam e that we give to the best available explanation of all that is (cf Peacocke 1990:134).
In focusing on the im portance of the n atural sciences, we should th en have an openness for that which reaches beyond the world o f the natural sciences (i.e. to the w orld on which the social sciences, history, philosophy and theology focus). In this w ider context, we could discover th a t theology and science bo th sh are no t only a m utually enriching quest for intelligibility, but also the im portance o f tradition and the explanatory role of in terp re ted experience. A n honest analysis of the differen ces betw een the sciences, and betw een theological and scientific explanations, might 442 NTS 49/3 (1993) / 
